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Popular Impact of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution 
by Martin Hayford 
(History 2225) 
he Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was extolled as a revolution of the people.  But how much 
did the actual people of Russia have to do with the revolution?  To what degree were they 
manipulated?  Vladimir Lenin and the other inner-circle Bolsheviks may have considered 
themselves the ―common man,‖ but this was true only in theory.  In practice, the common man‘s 
Russian Revolution was entirely removed from that of the Bolsheviks‘. 
In her memoir, Marooned in Moscow: The Story of an American Woman Imprisoned in 
Soviet Russia,  Marguerite Harrison illuminated a rarely seen view of common Russian people 
directly following the Bolshevik Revolution. In doing so she revealed how the revolution influenced 
the common people—an influence of tainted gifts and unchecked repression. 
The earliest Bolshevik-instituted changes that affected the common people were great, 
sweeping reforms.  However, these reforms manifested themselves locally as a very personal 
intrusion into people‘s daily lives.  One example was the push for education, a value that was 
stressed heavily by the communist party.  The education contained elements of indoctrination as well 
as Russification, yet as a new phenomenon was an exciting prospect for many Russians.  Marguerite 
Harrison discovers this early into her journey, just after crossing into Russia:  ―I found that there had 
formerly been one primary school in Lochnitsa, with sixty-five pupils.  At that time, four hundred 
pupils were registered in the primary schools and the gymnasium or secondary school‖ (Harrison 39).  
This fact surprises her greatly, as does the location of the aforementioned schools; they were on the 
frontier and in the war zone.  But this was no exception in the Bolshevik push.  To balance out this 
cost of widespread higher education, the Bolsheviks benefitted from the opportunity for political 
indoctrination.  Lenin clearly had no qualms with regard to politicizing education; in fact, he 
conveniently found the issue unavoidable:  ―‗The very term ―apolitical‖ or ―nonpolitical‖ education,‘ 
said Lenin in November 1920, ‗is a piece of bourgeois hypocrisy, nothing but a deception of the 
masses....  We must put the matter frankly,  and openly declare, despite all the old lies, that education  
cannot help but be connected with politics‘‖ (McClelland 820).  This explosion of education coupled 
with the Bolshevik views of politics in schools created a wholly different kind of intrusion into the 
life of the Russian people. 
In one way, the opportunity for education was accepted gratefully—if also a bit warily.  This 
wariness proved to be justified as the schools became less about actual education, and more about 
social manipulation.  Lenin‘s main goal was for ―…the ‗bad‘ and ‗unskilled‘ Russian workers to be 
‗schooled in the culture of capitalism‘—to become skilled and disciplined workers and to send their 
sons to engineering college—so that the country could overcome its backwardness in the transition 
towards socialism‖ (Figes 743).  Although the intent seemed pure, the implementation of such a 
system was seen as little more than meddling.  Not only that, but it was also a decidedly deceitful 
system.  Under the guise of furthering education, Lenin and the Bolsheviks instituted what amounted 
to a secret agenda.  Whether or not this was successful is not entirely clear.  It was easy for Lenin to 
say he would like to change the way people thought, but actually changing people‘s thoughts was 
met with subdued and whispered resistance. This kind of intrusion—one where millions of people 
were not only newly enrolled as students, but then involuntarily indoctrinated—was drastic, and in 
many cases, unwelcome.  However, because of other intrusions that initially benefitted the 
commoners, the indoctrination tended to be overlooked. 
T 
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Perhaps the most pleasing change implemented by the Bolsheviks was the redistribution of 
land.  One of the first decisions the revolutionaries made was to return the land to the people who 
worked on it.  Although they were neither convinced by the legitimacy of this action nor understood 
the complex social and political implications, they were certainly not going to complain.  When 
explaining this socialization in her book, Harrison wrote that the people may have complained about 
the specifics of the situation, ―but they will never rise en masse against any government which leaves 
them in possession of the land‖ (Harrison 37).  This was a very calculated move by the Bolsheviks 
and, indeed, it worked to their advantage in placating their people.  In reality, the idea for the 
nationalization and subsequent socialization of the land was a Socialist-Revolutionary movement, 
initially unaligned with the communist ideals of the Bolsheviks.  These Socialist-Revolutionaries had 
the popular support of the peasants, necessitating the Bolsheviks to collaborate with the intent to 
absorb the other movement. 
In explanation of these actions, Trotsky said, ―‗The political expropriation of the Socialist-
Revolutionary party was a necessary prerequisite to the economic expropriation of the landlords and 
the bourgeoisie‖ (Lissner 147).  This statement reveals the true intent of the Bolsheviks that would 
not manifest itself to the Russian people until Stalin‘s collectivization.  The system created with the 
peasant landowners was never meant to be permanent, but was indeed a stepping stone similar to the 
New Economic Policy (NEP).  This stepping stone, however, was less concerned with the ideology 
of communism and more to do with garnering political support.  As mentioned by Harrison, these 
newly land-wealthy people would have no desire to raise arms against their seemingly generous 
government; furthermore, they would be all the more likely to support them in political matters.  In 
this way, it seemed to be a successful strategy for both sides—at least for the time being. 
It was in the infancy of this program that Harrison observed the effects.  Even then she 
mentions that while clearly happy about owning their own land, the people were yet suspicious of the 
implications: ―Many [peasants] of them are often dubious about this free gift from the government, 
and officials are often approached by the peasants with offers to pay for their newly acquired 
interests‖ (Harrison 37).  Once again, the people recognized the taint that was associated with this 
gift—just as they had with their education.  It was unfortunate that their material gain coupled with a 
perceived improvement over their old autocratic government masked any objection that might be 
had; it was rare to find a common man who would rather be a serf than own his land. 
The issues of education and land socialization were underhanded and contrived on the part of 
the Bolsheviks, yet they both allowed for major gains in the peasant classes.  The morality of these 
intrusions is unclear, but the impression is that any benefit to the common man was incidental. 
There were plenty of Bolshevik activities where morality was thrown out the window and 
there were no benefits for the common people—incidental or otherwise.  Harrison‘s clearest 
experience with this is her imprisonment in Moscow.  It was not necessarily the treatment—which 
was by her accounts civil—but the act of imprisonment itself which was unjust.  Ironically, 
Marguerite Harrison‘s arrest was one of the few that held any legitimacy; she was an American spy.  
But the Russians with whom she was detained had a different story to share.  None of them seemed 
to be guilty of anything of importance.  Indeed many of them were deemed counter-revolutionaries, a 
catch-all term that was used by the Bolsheviks to describe anyone they wanted to imprison.  The 
most disturbing case was that of Elizaveta Eduardovna who at the time, ―had been arrested some 
weeks before, and up to that time had no knowledge of the charges against her‖ (Harrison 253).  It is 
important to note that the occupants of this prison and many others were not only former peasants; a 
great many prisoners were formerly of the aristocracy.  In a way, though, these people were newly 
relegated to the same social class as the peasants, with the Bolsheviks replacing them as the ruling 
class. 
What all of these prisoners had in common was a question: Why am I here?  Even those who 
were formally charged did not understand what their crime was.  These ―counter-revolutionaries,‖ 
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more often than not, were nothing of the sort, but that did not worry the Bolsheviks.  They willingly 
drew up ―…omnibus clauses that gave courts arbitrary powers to sentence undesirables for alleged 
counterrevolutionary activity…For the first time in legal history, the function of legal proceedings 
was defined to be not dispensing justice but terrorizing the population‖ (Pipes 401).  The effect of 
this system was profound.  When it was impossible to trust the courts to have even a shred of 
morality—not to mention legality—the Russian people had nowhere to turn.  Now it became possible 
to unintentionally be opposed to the government; it was at the discretion of the Bolsheviks to 
imprison their people as they saw fit.  It was upon this realization that the earlier wariness and 
discontent became horror to those who realized what their nation had become. 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was a successful revolution...for the Bolsheviks.  With the 
Tsar ousted and the Provisional Government under Alexander Kerensky overpowered, the 
Bolsheviks faced little political opposition.  What really ensured their success, however, was the 
support of the people.  These people were bribed, indoctrinated, and, if they still resisted, imprisoned.  
The inevitable conclusion of these facts is that the revolution‘s success did not extend to the people.  
Although the revolution was intended to be ―of the people,‖ it ended up being against them.  
Harrison‘s firsthand account is one of only a few that truly revealed the very different revolution of 
the people. 
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